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In the  early  i990s, Zambia  initiated an ambitious program of liberalization that  significantly
opened the economy, shifting from a highly regulated and centralized to a more market-based and
liberal  economic  paradigm.  While  these  changes  have  profoundly  affected  the  economic
environment  for the  agricultural sector, they  have up  to now  failed  to  alter the  structure of
production  and  help  realize the  efficiency  gains that  were  expected to  be  associated  with
economic  liberalization.  The  rural  economy continues  to  be  highly  dependent  on  maize,
producers'  participation  in markets  for  input as well  as  output has  hardly increased,  credit
remains out of the reach of the ordinary producer, and no appreciable change in investment can
be discerned.
This paper examines  whether this  disappointing performance is due to  the  fact that  reforms
undermined the profitability of agricultural production or due to  other factors, such as market
imperfections and structural limitations at the household level. This is important for policy advice
because, depending on  which  of these two  possibilities is correct, different  forms  of policy
intervention would be appropriate - either price measures to improve the profitability of farming
or non-price policies aiming facilitating  increased private sector involvement  combined with
better provision of public goods.
We analyze this issue using data from a two-year panel of about 5000 rural households. Panel
data econometric methods allow us to overcome the biases inherent in cross sectional analysis
and, from estimation of a production function plus associated demand equation for land, fertilizer,and credit, make inferences regarding the productivity of different factors. Our main results are as
follows:
*  Fertilizer has a significant output-increasing effect. While extending fertilizer use to the
large number of producers who are currently not using this input would be highly profitable
economically, increasing the amount actually applied by the small number of producers with
access to this input is not profitable.
*  Cattle ownership increases income directly, acts as an "insurance" by allowing producers
to till their fields in a more timely fashion in times of delayed rain, increases area of land
cultivated, and  improves access to  credit and  fertilizer markets.  This points  towards  the
persistence  of  significant  imperfections in  markets  for  rural  labor,  credit,  and  draught
animals, but at the same time suggests that policies to increase cattle ownership in rural areas
could have high payoffs.
- We find, somewhat surprisingly, that credit has a direct productivity increasing effect -
most likely through supervision that is associated with it. This notwithstanding, the main
impact of credit is through increases in cultivated area and -as  in the case of fertilizer-  major
benefits are likely to be realized by providing access to producers who do currently not have
access to any credit.
*  In terms of total factor productivity, female headed households are as productive as male
headed households. They are, however, disadvantaged with respect to  credit  access and,
partly as a consequence, use less land and fertilizer. This could point towards labor market
imperfections or higher risk aversion on the part of these households.
*  Supply  of  extension  has  a  positive,  though  insignificant,  impact  on  total  factor
productivity and no significant impact on demand for cultivated area. Improving the quality
of extension and gearing it more to be in line with Zambia's relative factor endowment would
thus  be  a  necessary  precondition  for  the  expansion  of  such  services  to  be  justified
economically.
*  Once other inputs are accounted for, education does not affect productivity or the amount
of area cultivated. However, education enables farmers to overcome market imperfections, as
reflected in the fact that more educated farmers demand higher amounts of fertilizer and
credit per hectare, tend to be more integrated into output markets.
Section two describes the sectoral background and, in this context, posits the key question to be
investigated and the  relationship to  earlier literature. A  detailed discussion of the  conceptualmodel and  estimation  issues follows in section three.  Section four discusses data  issues and
empirical  results.  Section  five  concludes  by  reviewing  implications  for  policy  and  further
research.
2.  SECTOR BACKGROUND AND DATA SOURCES
Despite an abundant land resource (75 million hectares, 55% of which are suitable for agricultural
production) favorable agro-climatic endowment, and low population density (a total of 9 million
people out of which slightly less than 6 million live in rural areas), Zambia has long neglected its
rural population and agricultural sector.
At  the  macro  level, almost  exclusive  reliance  on  copper  for  exports,  industrial  protection,
overvalued exchange rates, and unsustainable fiscal policies all contributed to a long-term decline
of the productive infrastructure in a country that had, in the early 1960s, a per capita GDP higher
than Korea.
These macro-economic policies were complemented by unsustainable government interventions
at the sectoral level (Jansen 1991). Producer subsidies for fertilizer and maize led to the extension
of maize cultivation into unsuitable areas which  increased vulnerability to drought,  distorted
factor prices, and biased the direction of research away from high value export crops to staples
with low profitability. Although Zambia does not have a strong comparative advantage in bulk
commodities, more  than  50% of research and extension resources were regularly devoted  to
maize,  mainly  because of price distortions  introduced by  government policies (World  Bank,
1992). As a result, Zambia lost ground even in production of commodities (e.g. tobacco) where it
had once been a leading producer in the region (Keyser 1996).
In addition, consumer subsidies posed a huge fiscal burden. Between 1971 and 1988 the average
subsidy to consumers amounted to about 70% of the price of maize meal maize related subsidies
accounted for almost 20% of total government spending in the  1980s (McPherson, 1995) Pan-
territorial and pan-seasonal pricing, together with state monopoly trading, distorted incentives for
private sector storage and helped to establish an inefficient marketing and processing structure.
Credit subsidies biased investment decisions, discouraged savings mobilization, and undermined
the viability of an independent financial system - real interest rates were negative throughout the
1981-93 period, with a peak of -137% in 1992 (World Bank 1992).
Following a number of aborted attempts at reform (e.g. Jansen and Ruvumo 1992; McPherson
1995), the government that took power in 1991 initiated a series of far-reaching macro-economicand  sectoral  reforms  including  the  elimination  of  subsidies,  privatization,  and  greater
decentralization. From our perspective, two issues are of relevance. First, the reductions in maize
prices  together  with the  increases in fertilizer  prices caused by  the  elimination of  subsidies
unambiguously worsened the terms of trade for the agricultural sector. Second, withdrawal of
government procurement and distribution agents was supposed to open up space for the private
sector  to  exploit  profit  opportunities  - but  this  was  countervailed  by  continued  ad-hoc
involvement by the public sector which greatly undermined predictability for the public sector.
Conceptual models predict that these reforms should lead to a major shift of producers out of
maize (Holden, Taylor, and Hampton 1999)  and emergence of a private trading sector that would
realize significant welfare gains (Mwanaumo, Masters, and Preckel 1997). However, little of this
has materialized, owing mainly to the fact that adjustment was associated with reductions in input
use rather than changes in the quantity or mix of output. On the output side, between 1990 and
1996 Zambia's  rural households continued to produce mainly for subsistence (only about 40%
sold in the market, virtually unchanged from 1991), rural incomes remained backward and low
(about one third urban households), and no diversification out of maize took place in response to
changed price signals - the share of area planted to maize in 1996 and 1997 was higher than it
had been in 1990. Changes in input prices had not only a marked effect on application of inputs;
use of hybrid seed and fertilizer use was reduced by one half and one third, respectively, they
were also associated with a reduction in farmers' capital stock. Partly due to a drought in 1992
from which the sector has yet to recover, the percentage of producers owning livestock decreased
by almost one third (from 18% to 12%) between 1992 and 1996. It appears that policy reforms
have contributed to stagnation or even regression, instead of helping Zambia's agricultural sector
realize the strong regional growth linkages that have been demonstrated in the literature (Hazell
and Hojjati 1995).
The question whether this disappointing performance is due to the fact that reforms undermined
the profitability of agricultural production or due to other factors, such as market imperfections
and structural limitations at the household level, that prevent a more vigorous supply response is
of considerable policy relevance. We aim to provide and answer by focusing on two aspects.
First, we are interested whether producers apply variable inputs in a profit-maximizing fashion.
Second, we aim to  identify structural determinants of factors demand that may  underlie such
inefficient allocation,  if  it exists.  In  doing so we  examine  variables at  the  household level
(education,  female  headship,  asset  endowments)  and  in  the  broader  market  environment
(extension, access to infrastructure).While none of these  issues are new, our approach improves on previous literature by  using a
larger  sample  and  applying  panel  data  econometric techniques.  A  number  of contributions
(Hatting  et  al.  1998, Savadogo et  al.  1995, etc.) have demonstrated that- farm  level data can
provide useful insights to examine these issues. However, these studies are characterized by small
samples (122 and 150 households, respectively), a restricted set of variables (e.g. no information
on household education, non-agricultural assets, or soil  quality is available), and  reliance  on
cross-sectional analysis. This limits not only the ability to generalize from the results obtained
and make broader inferences but, more importantly, may also bias the results significantly. The
reason is that there  is likely to be a strong correlation between the large number of unobserved
household and farm characteristics and input use. As, to take just  one example, more educated
farmers would tend  to  use  inputs more intensively, the coefficients on  observed inputs  in  a
traditional production  function will be biased upwards. Thus, the  impact of purchased inputs
would be overstated and cross-sectional evidence alone would appear to  suggest that  farmers
"'underuse"  these inputs.
To overcome these limitations of cross-sectional analysis, we apply panel data techniques. Under
the  condition  that  farmers'  unobserved characteristics are  time-invariant,  use  of  panel  data
techniques allows to overcome these limitations that have plagued the earlier literature and are
likely to have led to an upward bias on the coefficients for purchased inputs. Instead of making it
appear these  inputs  are  more  effective and  farmers  inefficient  in  not applying  the  optimal
quantities, they allow to retrieve structural parameters regarding the impact of specific inputs in
the  production  function.  Furthermore,  use  of  instrumental  variable  estimators  allows  us  to
estimate the impact of time invariant productivity shifters such as producers'  endowments of
physical assets, human capital, and their access to public services. Both the structural parameters
for  specific  inputs  and  the  productivity  shifters  enable  us  to  derive  more  precise  policy
recommendations.
Instead of relying on a survey that was specifically fielded for this purpose and the small sample
that is generally associated with such efforts, we use data on farm production from a panel of
4853 farm households from the Central Statistical Office's  Post Harvest Surveys for  1993/94
and1994/95. The data were collected sufficiently long after initiation of the reforms for them to
have shown at least some impact. While the time period covered is rather short, it coincides with
significant variability in the economic and agro-climatic environment such as the final closure of
official  credit  institutions, and a  drought in  1994/95. As a  result, there  is sufficient "within"
household variation in input use for panel data methods to  be meaningful and allowing us toestimate a production function and input demand functions for labor, fertilizer, and credit. Before
describing the data in detail, we discuss the conceptual model and estimation issues.
3.  MODEL AND ESTIMATION ISSUES
Conceptual Framework
Consider a  household i that  at time t may undertake production employing a Cobb-Douglas
technology given by:
(I)  ln(Y,,)  = ln(A,,)  + PI  ln(T1,)  +  3 21n(F,,+  1),
where Ti,  is the total area cultivated, F 1, is the total amount of fertilizer applied,Aj,  is an index that
measures the total factor productivity (TFP) achieved by household i at time t, and  1I and P32 are
technology parameters assumed to be constants across households and time. For simplicity we
assume that other inputs--as labor effort, seeds, mechanical and animal power--are employed in
fixed proportions to the cultivated area, i.e. T,,  represents the area of prepared and planted land!
We assume that the TFP index Ai, is detennined by household/farm i's observed and unobserved
characteristics at time t, specifying the following log-linear equation forAj,:
(2)  ln(A,,)  = ao +  cl'X;, + a2'Z, + rli +  1ij,.
In (2), Xi, and Z,  are vectors of observed household/farm specific time-variant and  invariant
characteristics,  respectively,  which  will be  described below. The  error term  in  (2)  has  two
components: (i) r1i is a  household/farm specific time-invariant effect, which  is known to  the
household at the time production decisions are made, but is unknown to the econometrician; and
(ii)  the  stochastic exogenous  shock ui,, which  is assumed to  be independent  and  identically
distributed (iid) across households and time, and is observed neither by the households nor the
econometrician.  For tractability  we assume that the  decision making  household's  conditional
expectation of exp(Q.j,)  given Xi,,  Z;, Tj,,  Fj,  equals one.
Thus, household i chooses T,,  and (F,,+  1) in order to maximize expected profits at year t which are
given by:
(3)  Pi,  =  E[Yj,  I  Xj,,Zj,Tj,,Fj,j  - r,T,,  - q,(F,,+1)  + q,
where r, is the market rental rate of prepared land, and q, is the market price (plus transportation
and application costs) of a unit of fertilizer.
'This  specification captures the fact that fertilizer is not an essential input, so that Fj,=O  does not imply in Yi,=O.The first order necessary conditions (FONCs) for maximum profit are respectively given by:
(4.a)  P7. - r, ￿  0, (P7- r,)T,, = 0, and TI, > 0;
(4.b)  P''-  q, ￿  0, (P 1;+±  - q,)(F,,+l) = 0, F,, > 0.
The solution to system (4) yields the reduced form demand equations for fertilizer and cultivated
area, which are given by:
(5.a)  lnT,, =  yo(w,q,,r ,;P)+ y1l(f)(ao  + ac'X;, + a 2'Zi + ale);
(5.b)  In(Fj,+l)= yo(w,,q,,r,;P)+  y(730Xco  + al'Xi, + a 2'Zi + Tj),
where Yk, 4k,Yk,  for k = 0,1 are functions of  the structural parameters in P and the exogenously
given  prices w,, q,. Thus,  under the above specification, the resulting reduced  form demand
equations are  linear  in the household/farm  specific effects m.,  and  moreover, rj  has  a  time-
invariant coefficient that can be eliminated by using fixed effects estimation techniques.
Econometric Model and Estimation Issues
The Production Function
Equations (1) and (2) suggest the estimation of the following regression equation:
(6)  ln(Y,,)  = ao + a'I'Xil + a2'Zi +  31ln(T,,)  + f3 21n(F 1,+ 1) + vi,
where vi, is a random disturbance with two components: i.e., v;, = Ili + ei,, where 1mi  is defined
above, and Si,  is a idiosyncratic household/farm shock in productivity which might be observable
by the household but not by the econometrician.
To estimate the structural parameters in (6), we must confront the problem of endogeneity of
cultivated area ln(T,r), fertilizer use ln(Fj,+ l,),  and asset endowments (Z), a common feature in
the estimation of production functions with household and farm level data. As seen in the reduced
form equations (4.a)-(4.b), both ln(T,r)  and ln(Fi,+ lU,)  are functions of unobserved time-invariant
household/farm characteristic m,  which is a component of vi,, the error term in (6). Therefore,
In(T,,) and ln(Fi,+ I  j,) are clearly correlated with the disturbance v;,, which implies that the OLS
estimator of the parameters in (6) will be biased and inconsistent.
As discussed in Mundlak (1996), panel-data can provide a wealth of Instrumental Variable (IV)
estimators  that  tackies  this  common  identification  problem  in  the  estimation  of production
functions via a primal approach. In what follows we discuss three IV estimators: (i) The within
(or  fixed-effects) estimator, (ii) the two-stage least squares estimator of Hausmann and Taylor(1981), hereafter the HT estimator, and the Amemyia and MaCurdy (1989), hereafter the AM
estimator. These are discussed below.
The Within Estimator: To simplify notation, rewrite equation (6) as:
Yi, =  11 'Xj, +  71 2'Zi +  + 1 £,i  i= 1,..,N;  t = I,..,T,
where xi, is a K x I vector collecting all the time-variant explanatory variables in equation (7),z,
is a  G  x  1 vector collecting  all the  time-invariant explanatory  variables, and it1 and  it 2 are
conformably dimensioned parameter vectors. We assume that the disturbances  si, are iid N(0,a 6
2)
and the individual effects m1  are iid N(O,u,, 2). The time and household-variant component 6,, are
assumed to be orthogonal to both the explanatory variables and the individual effects, whilerli
may be correlated with parts of x and z.
Combining all NT observations we can write (8) as:
y=  xn  +zn4+-V7  +£
where y and £  are NT x  1, x is NT x K, z is NT x G, and V is an NT x N matrix of individual-
specific dummy variables. Now define the matrix Pv = V(V'V)-'V  as the  projection onto the
column space of V. Thus, Pv is a matrix that transforms a vector of observation into a vector of
individual means across time:  i.e., Pvy,, = (=I_)zyi,  yi. Then, Qv = I - Pv  is defined as the
projection onto the null space of V, i.e., Q, produces a  vector of deviations from  individual
means: i.e., Pvy,= yj, -yp.
The within estimator is computed by projecting (9) onto the null space of V and performing least-
saquares. Because Q^z  = 0,  and Q,n = 0, only 7c 1 can be estimated. Therefore, the within estimator
of Rit is:
(10)  2hw  = (x'Q^x)Yx'QVY,
and  is consistent whether  or not the explanatory variables are correlated  with the  individual
effects 77i.  The problem with the within estimator is that it does not allow for the estimation of the
vector 7it 2 . In what follows we explore two estimators that will be consistent under some mild
orthogonality assumptions.
2SLS Estimators: As explained in Hausmann and Taylor (1981), a more efficient IV estimator can
be  computed  if  we  are  willing  to  assume  that  some explanatory  variables  in x  and z  are
orthogonal to the individual effects 17k.  Consider the partition ofx and z given by x = (xi, x2) and z=  (Zi,  z2),  such that xi, and  zi are orthogonal  to i7r,  but x 2 and Z2 are not. The HT 2sls estimator  is
therefore given by:
i,  2  [(X,  Z)'Q-1/
2pA  Q-1 2 (X,  Z)]-l  (X, Z)'Q"
2PA Q* 1/2y
where  Q&/I2  =  Q  + OPK,  is a weighting  matrix suclh  that 0 = Cy 6 ( 2 +  Tal 2 '',  PA = A(A 'A) A iS
the projection onto the column space of A. For the HT estimator, A is a matrix of instruments
given by:
A = (Q  xi, Q,x 2, P,Xi,  Zl)
Thus, each variable in  xi provides two instruments (Q,x 1 and P, xj), while the variables inx2 and
Zi provide one instrument each (QX2  and zi). The order condition for identification gives the
result that the number of columns in xl must be at least as large as the number of columns in Z2.
Amemyia and MaCurdy (I 986) suggests the following set of alternative instruments:
A = (Qv  xi, Q, x2, x  *, zi)
where xl* is a NTx  TK matrix where each column contains values ofxl,  for a single time period.
The AM estimator uses each of the xl variables as (T+ I). Its order condition for existence is that
Ttimes the number of columns in xl must be greater than or equal to the number of columns inzl.
As shown by Amemyia and MaCurdy (1986), consistency of the AM estimator will depend on a
stronger exogeneity assumption than the HT estimator. While the HT estimator requires only the
means of the xi  variables to be orthogonal to the individual effects, the AM estimator requires
orthogonality at each point in time. Nevertheless, asAmemyia and MaCurdy (1986) and Breusch,
Mizon and Schmidt (1989) point out, orthogonality between P, xl and the individual effects n is
likely to result from the orthogonality between x,  and n.
Input demand equations
The IV methods described above are also employed to estimate the parameters of the reduced
form of a demand for cultivated land equation. However, because fertilizer demand is censored at
zero,  a  Tobit  specification is required.  We use  two  types  of estimators  for  these  censored
equations: (i) Bo Honore's (1992) trimmed least squares estimator (TLS) for fixed-effects panel
data models,  and a  simulated maximum  likelihood (SML) estimator  which assumes that  the
2 individual-specific random effect are orthogonal to the explanatory variables.
2 For a description of SML estimators for panel data Tobit type models, see Gourieroux and Monfort, 1993.As indicated in equations (5.a) and (5.b), we cannlot  identify the own- and cross-price elasticities
of demand since the functions yo(w,,q,,r,;f3)  and y0(w,,q,,r,;f3)  do not vary across cross-sectional
units.  Therefore we focus on estimating the effect of the houselhold specific variablesXi, and Zi
on demand for inputs so that we can compute their overall expected effect on farm output. For
instance, the total impact of ox ownership on output is given by:
dY  _  DY  DY aT  aY  a(F + 1)  DT  a(F  +  1)
dXj  DX, ATDX,  D(F+1)  DXi  aX  2  aXj
where estimates of ox;,  Pi, and P32,  are obtained tlhrough  the estimation of the production function,
and estimates of  aT  and  (F  )  are obtained through the estimation of the  input demand
DxJ  Dx.j
equations (5.a) and (5.b). Note however, that the estimates of  a  and  (F  )  are themselves
axJ  ax.
functions of the production parameters P3i,  and the total factor productivity parameters (I  ,.
Variahles included in tlte estimation
Time-varying  explanatory  variables  included  in the  production function  are  cultivated  area,
fertilizer  used, household population, the value of cattle owned by the household, the stock of
draught  animals (oxen)  and farm  equipment, the  amount of credit  received,  and  a  "weather
shock" variable. "Weather shocks" are defined as the percentage deviation of precipitation from
its 30-year average during the planting season, two growing periods, and one harvesting season.
The implicit assumption that too much rain can be as harmful as too little of it seems to be quite
realistic under Zambian conditions. Higher order terms (i.e. the weather shock variable squared,
cubed and  raised to  the  forth power) are  introduced to  account for  possible  non-linearities.
Animal-owners' ability to perform farming operations in a more timely manner is likely to be of
particular relevance under  abnormal climatic  conditions. To  account for this  possibility,  we
interact the  weather  shock with the  value  of the  farm's  stock of  draught animals and  farm
equipment.  Of the  time varying variables, -household population, the  non-interacted weather
variables,  the  time  trend  and  district  dummies-time  trend  interactions  are  assumed  to  be
exogenous while the remainder are assumed to be endogenous (i.e., correlated with unobserved
individual effects).
Time-invariant  explanatory variables are the sex of the household head, access to  extension,
primary  and  secondary  education  dummies  and  sixty  district  dummies.  Extension  and  the
education  dummies  are  assumed  to  be  endogenous  while  the  remaining  time-invariantexplanatory variables are assumed exogenous. Unfortunately, input price data are not available
for the first year of the data and only selectively in the second year. Adding 60 district dummies
and their interaction with time (not reported) will avoid bias due to omission of price variables.
4.  RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Before discussing econometric estimation results it is of interest to describe intertemporal and
inter-regional variation in the data using descriptive statistics. As  illustrated  in table  1, rural
producer households in Zambia had on average 6.2 members and cultivated 1.9 hectares. The the
mean age of the household head was 45 and about 20% of households were female headed. 56%
and 15% have completed primary and secondary education, respectively, and 24% of households
had  access to  extension. Both value of total production and area cultivated  show significant
variation across regions, with output value ranging from K 407,000 in Central to  116,000 in
Western region (corresponding to mean areas of 2.82 and 1.44 hectares).
Looking at changes over time, one notes that output value changed little over time even though
area cultivated decreased and market participation, measured as the percentage of output (in value
terms)  sold decreased for  almost all  provinces. The share of producers with access to credit
decreased significantly, from 19.2% to 9.8%, in addition to a significant drop in the mean amount
received. This decrease in access to financing seems to have precipitated a reduction both in the
share of producers having access to fertilizer (from 35% to 27%) and a halving of the amount
spent on fertilizer by those who use it. To examine the implications of this for production in more
detail we turn to econometric analysis.
4.2 Econmetric results
Results from the production function estimation (table 2) point to a number of interesting results.
First,  availability offamily  labor is an important determinant of output,  indicating that  labor
markets  in  rural  Zambia  are thin  or  non-existent. The elasticity  of  output with  respect  to
household population is between 0.07 and 0.12, suggesting that even once other factors such as
area, fertilizer use, and ownership of oxen are controlled for, larger households tend to be more
productive than  small households. The rationale for such a  relationship is that, as one would
expect in an environment where land is relatively abundant, larger households would have lessdifficulty to muster the necessary labor to complete critical tasks during seasons of peak demand
(e.g. weeding) when spot labor markets dry up.
Second, the data also allow ascertaining the impact offertilizer  on output without the biases
intoduced by unobserved land quality and farmer skills which commonly plague cross-sectional
analysis. This is of interest in view of the heated policy discussion on whether or not use of
fertilizer will still be profitable at the increased post-liberalization prices for this input. We find
that the output elasticity of fertilizer varies between 0.07 and 0.08. To interpret this  figure, we
have to distinguish between farmers who apply fertilizer to their fields and those who do not. For
the first  group, the  marginal benefit from applying additional amounts of fertilizer  is slightly
lower than the marginal cost, pointing towards consistency with profit-maximizing behavior. This
strongly supports the hypothesis that, even at the increased post-liberalization prices, fertilizer use
is economically profitable and that farmers with access to fertilizer therefore apply more or less
the "optimum" amount and do not appear to be quantity-rationed.
By contrast, producers who are rationed out of the fertilizer market, seem to forgo significant
productivity and welfare benefits. Estimates suggest that providing producers without fertilizer
access with the average amount of fertilizer applied by users (170kg) would increase their income
by about US$85, generating a 70% return on the investment of US$ 503 This high return points
towards non-price rationing, whereby access rather than  price appears to be the relevant problem.
The policy implication emerging from this is that, instead of aiming to curb "speculative excess"
by  traders through continuing government involvement in fertilizer  procurement, encouraging
private sector entry would be expected to result in increased and more optimal use of this input.
Descriptive statistics, which indicate that that many farmers close to the line of rail bought more
than  double the  amount  of fertilizer they  actually used,  support this  notion and  furthermore
suggest  that  government  subsidies  constituted  a  de-facto  transfer  to  the  rich  who  have
advantageous access to infrastructure (Deininger et al. 1998).
Third,  to  identify  the  impact  of  time-varying  factors, the  instrumental  variable  techniques
described  earlier  also  allow  us  to  identify the  effect  of  time-invariant or  slowly  changing
conditions  such as  household headslhip, distance  to  infrastructure, education,  and  access to
extension  services. We  find that  female-headed households are  as  productive  as their  male
counterparts, i.e. the dummy is negative but not significant. While the state of rural infrastructure
is  often  viewed  as  a  major  obstacle  to  expansion as  well  as  diversification  of  agriculturalproduction, our estimates suggest that a producer's distance to markets does not affect total factor
productivity, altlhough  it has an impact on factor use.
Similar conclusions hold for education (separated into primary and secondary) which does not
seem to increase productivity, but, as can be seen from the fertilizer demand function and credit
use equation (tables 3 and 4), affects input use in what can still be considered an environment
with  numerous market  imperfections. One explanation might be that  agricultural  experience,
rather than formal education, is of greater relevance for increasing total factor productivity. The
share of individuals in any village who have access to extension (excluding the producer under
concern) has a  positive but statistically insignificant impact on total  factor productivity. This
would support the claim that the government's system has not yet adjusted to fully incorporate
the realities and requirements of a liberalized environment.
Fourth, the results of the production function estimation allow to make inferences on the impact
of credit access. They  indicate that there  is a positive and statistically significant relationship
between the amount of credit received by a farm household and total factor productivity. Thus, an
extra  US $100 (100,000 K) of credit received by  an average farm  household, is expected to
increase output by between 2.6 and 4%, even when other inputs are held constant. Moreover, we
note that increasing access to credit from zero to the mean value for the sample of credit users (K
150,000) would, according to the estimates, augment output of non-borrowers by 3% due just to
this increase in total factor productivity.  This is surprising, as one would normally expect any
impact of credit pre-planting season rain is below the long-term average) possession of animals
would allow to complete soil preparationi  area faster once soil moisture has reached workable
levels, thus minimizing the yield loss incurred. Obviously, owners would tend to till their own
fields before renting out to others, implying that farmers who own draught animals are -at  least to
some extent-  less vulnierable to climatic shocks. This  is of particular interest since a  similar
interaction term between the number of household members and rainfall (suggesting that larger
households have an advantage in mobilizing family labor quickly) is insignificant.
In addition to its impact on total factor productivity, ownership of productive assets (in this case
draught animals) is also a key determinant of expected land demand, which in turn has a large
impact on  production.5 The estimates  imply that  by  exogenously receiving one  pair of oxen
The fertilizer price is the real cost ex depot. This is needed because the survey contains too little detail on modalities of payment for
prices to be useful. Adding transport costs for a distance of 500 km (at a cost of US $ 0.1 per t-km) reduces the return to about 45%,
which should still be sutlicient to finance the input on credit.
4  Under the assumptions discussed in the appendix the iV estimators are not biased by the  likely correlation between unobserved
managerial skills and credit access.
9  Recall from the results of the production function regression that land has a production elasticity of between 0.6 and 0.7.valued  at  K310,000,  non-ox owners would  be able to  increase their  area  of  cultivation by
approximately  25  percent,  which  in  turn  represents  an  expected  increase  in  income  of
approximately  18  percent  (or  K45,000,  given  that  the  average  non-ox-owner  generates
approximately K250,000 of farm  output). If we add  the 4-12 percent  increase in total factor
productivity computed above, we conclude that non-ox-owners would be able  to pay back the
pair of oxen plus interest in approximately 4 to 7 years (given a  total increase  in income of
approximately K40,000 to K80,00.0  per year).
The estimated effect of draught animal ownership oni  producers' propensity to apply fertilizer is
ambiguous (table 3). Wilie  large and statistically significant under the SML model, the impact is
small and insignificant under the TLS model. Since the SML estimate is only consistent under the
assumption  of  orthogonality  between  the  farm-specific  random  effect  and  the  explanatory
variables, whereas the TLS estimate is consistent even when this orthogonality condition does not
hold, we conclude that there is no  significant direct impact of draught animals ownership on
fertilizer demand. To Anotlher  way in which ownership of draught animals may affect farm output
is through its impact oni  fertilizer use and area cultivated via increased credit access.  That is,
because draught animals may serve as collateral in credit transactions, draught animals owners
may have better access to credit than non-owners. To test this hypothesis, we estimate a credit
access random-effects Probit model. Results, presented in the last column of table 4, suggest that,
indeed, draught animal ownership has a significant impact on credit access'  Taking all of these
effects together ox ownership would increase household income by about 22% or K 56,000 per
year. Even with a real interest rate of 15%, the capitalized value of this benefit would be greater
tlhan  the  cost of the investment, suggesting that even in a high-interest rate environment, and
neglecting indirect benefits, acquisition of oxen would be a profitable investment and that the
issues involved should be explored in more detail. 7
5.  CONCLUSION
In this paper we explored whether structural factors or lack of profitability are at the root of the
apparently very  limited supply response by  rural producers in Zambia. Using data that  were
'  We opt for a random-effects Probit model instead of a fixed-effects Tobit model because we  cannot determined ex ante whether
observed credit use is determined by supply, in which case use would indicate access, or demand. If farmers who own more draught
animals demand more credit but are also less likely to be credit rationed, the fixed-effects Tobit model, would likely yield an upward-
biased estimate of the impact of oxen ownership on access to credit. The reason is that it departs from the implicit assumption that all
producers are credit rationed. Such bias would be smaller under a random-effects specification since poor farmer with zero loans are
less likely to implicitly demand zero credit.
The purpose of this example is to highlight the  implication from regression results rather than to provide an in-depth economic
calculation. We therefore implicitly assume that the cost of feeding the animal is approximately equal to the indirect benefits such as
manure, milk, beet; insemination services, etc. from the animal that are not captured in our output measure.collected 3-4 years after a comprehensive set of reforms had been initiated, one observes only a
very limited responses from the productive sector. Three main conclusions emerge.
First, using panel data methods we can clearly reject the hypothesis that farmers reduced use of
purchased inputs because this  is no longer profitable - and that therefore government should
intervene to improve the functioning of markets and reduce input prices faced by producers. By
contrast, the fact that use of purchased inputs is highly profitable points to the importance of non-
price  factors. Policies that would  increase private sector activity  in this  industry and  remove
producers'  non-price rationing through provision of public goods that  increase input demand
could have significant productivity benefits. This is consistent with the finding emerging from a
large  number  of  participatory assessments according to  which  unreliable  delivery-which  is
clearly  related  to  Government  intervention in  physical  input distribution-  is  a  more  serious
problem for producers than the non-affordability of agricultural inputs (Milimo 1995). Given the
high returns from increasing access to fertilizer, and the failure of public sector involvement to
guarantee such access in the  1992-95 post-liberalization period, there appears little justification
for continued Govemment involvemenit  in physical distribution of inputs.
Second, under Zambian conditions of land abundance, ownership of productive assets is a key
constraint  to  enhanced  productivity,  increases in  cultivated area,  greater  use  of credit  and
purchased inputs, and better adaptation to the vagaries of climate. Regression coefficients suggest
that purchase of a pair of oxen is a profitable venture even at  high real interest rates. Greater
focus on  factors related  to accumulation of productive assets  (such as lack of knowledge on
management  practices,  threat  of  infectious  diseases,  and  non-availability  of  financial
infrastructure to  obtain  longer-term capital) may  be a  more promising focus  for government
policy  than  continued  concern about  -and  self-defeating  intervention to  ensure-  the  proper
functioning of input markets. The fact that lack of long-term credit facilities to allow acquisition
of productive  assets  such as  cattle  is one  of the  key  concerns emerging  from participatory
assessments (Tembo et. al 1995; Francis et al. 1997) supports our analysis and suggests that more
detailed study of mechanisms addressing this constraint could have a high payoff.
Finally, attempts to increase agricultural productivity and rural well-being through provision of
public services have thus far largely been unsuccessful. Education has a very significant impact
on input demand but not on agricultural productivity andthe impact of extension is insignificant.
Our interpretation is that the constraints facing rural producers in Zambia are still related more to
market  access and  the ability  to  obtain the  necessary  inputs  in  a  highly  volatile  economic
environment rather than the application of more productive technology. At the same time, thiscalls for a  thorough assessment of the technology available and the  messages that  are being
disseminated through  public technical  assistance. Unless  these  can  be adapted  more to  the
prevailing economic environment and the  incentive structure facing producers, greater  public
spending on teclnical  assistance may be difficult to justify.
From a methodological point of view, our results suggest that farm-level panel information can
provide policy-relevant insights that avoid the difficulties inherent in the interpretation of cross-
sectional data. While the panel underlying our study was collected more by  accident than  by
design, greater emphasis on collection of panel data, adoption of the necessary protocols to ensure
data quality, and inclusion of other household characteristics (e.g. asset endowments) is likely to
increase the usefulness of such data to yield policy relevant conclusions.
From a substantive point of view, our analysis supports the notion that without "re-emphasizing"
the role of agriculture,  it will be difficult for  African countries to lay the basis for  sustained
growth and prevent a reversal of policy that would undo much of the progress and potential from
recent liberalization. It is now recognized that, eYen  though Africa faces specific challenges in the
field of health, most of the stagnation of the rural sector has been policy-induced, that the gap
between potential and actual output is greatest in Africa, and that demand is unlikely to become a
constraint any time soon (McPherson 1999). This reinforces the importance of providing public
goods, in addition to price policies, to bring about a sustained agricultural supply response (Schiff
and Montenegro 1997). The fact that use of purchased inputs is way below the optimum, that
credit constraints prevent investment in productivity-enhancing technology such as livestock, and
that public  services are  not (yet) effective in delivering the needed technology, suggests that
much  remains to  be done to  address non-price related  constraints to  agricultural  production,
generated  and  disseminate technology, and thus help  rural producers make  better  use  of the
resources at their disposal.References:
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Total  Central  Copperbelt  Eastern  Luapula  Lusaka  Northern  Northwest  South  West
Household size  6.19  7.37  5.99  5.93  5.49  6.98  5.93  5.55  8.71  5.58
Female headed  20.52%  16.67%  18.43%  21.35%  21.22%  16.20%  19.47%  18.31%  12.07%  31.22%
Access to extension  23.77%  14.08%  22.44%  30.76%  13.43%  24.22%  29.18%  28.34%  27.24%  15.66%
Primary education  56.46%  58.11%  50.00%  57.20%  60.10%  47.22%  55.87%  50.00%  66.84%  53.01%
Secondary education  14.84%  22.81%  26.28%  8.52%  13.92%  16.67%  17.47%  10.83%  16.71%  11.06%
Age  45.44  45.72  44,42  45.40  44.45  45.44  44.34  45.29  46.09  48.31
Area cultivated (hectares)  1.89  2.82  1.58  2.24  1.18  1.72  1.60  1.20  3.30  1.44
Value of production (1000 K)  231.44  407.08  224.36  257.93  139.38  157.37  230.35  171.65  358.46  116.18
Value of sales  90.12  212.61  101.09  92.94  34.78  47.80  92.01  68,27  123.51  37.50
Share of sales  38.94%  52.23%  45.06%  36.03%  24.95%  30.37%  39.94%  39.77%  34.46%  32.27%
Posession of caUtle  19.14%  27.85%  9.49%  27.67%  1.10%  21.30%  8.42%  6.37%  60.88%  19.84%
Value of cattle (1000 K)  152.62  240.77  69.38  162.71  3.82  172.22  33.43  42.25  712.81  172.64
Ownership of draught animals  14.86%  26.75%  8.03%  22.92%  0.17%  18.52%  2.32%  1,43%  57.56%  12.20%
Access to credit  14.53%  21.71%  4.56%  24.58%  9,85%  23.61%  13.51%  5.25%  16.05%  5.45%
Amount of credit received (1000 K)  160.75  210.88  165.64  134,23  132.56  81.47  136.63  70.09  281.45  252.27
Use fertilizer  31.21%  61.51%  25.73%  27.42%  17.74%  75.00%  35.58%  19.75%  48.28%  10.24%
Value of fertilizer used  80.36  96.42  106.18  108.48  45.92  51.49  58.74  46.25  79.91  118.00
No of observations  9,706  912  548  2,042  1,178  216  2,198  628  754  1,230
1994
Area cultivated  2.01  3.07  1.68  2.34  1.28  1.77  1.71  1.07  3.77  1.53
Value of production (1000 K)  227.93  386.76  208,32  247.76  123.51  184.61  243.52  166.15  376.35  106.27
Value of sales  95.32  207.41  99.35  84.49  32.76  62.89  114.62  73.12  149.09  37.87
Share of sales  41.82%  53.63%  47.69%  34.10%  26.53%  34.07%  47.07%  44.01%  39.62%  35.64%
Ownership of cattle  18.61%  27.85%  9.49%  25.47%  1.53%  21.30%  8.55%  5.73%  59.42%  19.84%
Value of cattle (1000 K)  127.01  228.55  64.16  141.74  4.79  169.44  28.39  32.10  505.78  157.37
Ownership of draught animals  15.66%  27.19%  8.76%  24.19%  0.34%  18.52%  2.55%  1.59%  58.36%  14.63%
Access to credit  19.23%  26.54%  5.47%  29.29%  14.43%  32.41%  21.02%  9.87%  19.89%  6.67%
Amount of credit received (1000 K)  31.97  59.29  10.04  41.86  14.02  26.93  30.35  6.87  62.47  20.19
Use fertilizer  34.82%  65.57%  22.26%  31.54%  22.75%  87.04%  40.49%  26.75%  48.28%  11.22%
Value of fertilizer used  97.46  112.94  192.83  131.77  51.09  58.63  73.30  53.31  94.41  144.73
1995
Area cultivated  1.76  2.58  1.48  2.14  1.07  1.67  1.48  1.33  2.82  1.35
Value of production (1000 K)  234.96  427.39  240.40  268.10  155.26  130.12  217.19  177.16  340.57  126.10
Value of sales  84.93  217.81  102.83  101.39  36.80  32.71  69.39  63.42  97.93  37.12
Share of sales  36.14%  50.96%  42,78%  37.82%  23.70%  25.14%  31.95%  35.80%  28.75%  29.44%
Ownership of cattle  19.68%  27.85%  9.49%  29.87%  0.68%  21.30%  8.28%  7.01%  62.33%  19.84%
Value of cattle (1000 K)  178,24  252.98  74.60  183.67  2.85  175.00  38.47  52.39  919.84  187.92
Access to credit  9.83%  16.89%  3.65%  19.88%  5.26%  14.81%  6.01%  0.64%  12.20%  4.23%
Amount of credit received (1000 K)  10.31  22.59  3.55  16.90  8.46  8.08  4.60  0.35  19.51  5.11
Ownership of draught animals  14.05%  26.32%  7.30%  21.65%  0.00%  18.52%  2.09%  1.27%  56.76%  9.76%
Use fertilizer  27.59%  67.46%  29.20%  23.31%  12.73%  62.96%  30.66%  12.74%  48.28%  9.27%
Value of fertilizer used  58.88  77.57  40.11  77.06  36.77  41.71  39.70  31.44  65.57  85.07Table 2: Summary of regression results
Production function equation  Land demand equation
Within estimator  IV Estimator  Within estimator  IV Estimator
Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value
Ln(area)  0.6292  46.8726  0.7157  37.322
Ln(HH population)  0.1238  5.6355  0.0908  3.857  0.247  12.6558  0.4185  7.6
Value of Cattle (1000 K)  0.0001  9.189  0.0001  8.018  0.00001  1.6613  0.0000  1.208
Credit Received (1000 K)  0.0003  3.1614  0.0004  4.122  0.001  15.2649  0.0016  5.407
Value of Oxen & implements (1000 K)  0.0004  4.2267  0.0001  2.455  0.0002  2.5575  0.0008  8.171
ln(Fert+1)  0.0723  17.1508  0.0755  5.684
Dummy for 95  -0.7321  -2.7064  0.337  2.841  -0.125  -5.982  -0.1683  -2.651
Rainfall deviation I (pre-planting period)  0.114  4.7054  0.0198  1.993  0.0072  6.0029  0.0079  2.715
Rainfall deviation I squared  -0.0047  -4.373  -0.0005  -1.071  -0.0001  -3.8391  -0.0002  -3.056
Rainfall deviation I cubic  -0.0001  -4.4121  0.00002  -1.267
Rainfall deviation I fourth power  0.00002  4.4256  0.00001  1.263
Rainfall deviation 11  (growing period)  0.0056  6.2458  0.0019  3.876
Rainfall deviation Illi  (harvest period)  -0.0092  -3.687  0.0005  0.511
Rainfall deviation I  x Fertilizer  -0.0008  -6.1354  -0.0004  -1.928
Rainfall deviation I x Oxen  -0.00002  -2.0854  -0.00004  -3.001  -0.00004  -6.7952  0.0000  -0.821
Rainfall deviation I x Oxen squared  0.00001  5.5469  0.00003  2.426
Rainfall deviation I x HH pop  0.0001  0.235  -0.001  -1.207  -0.0017  -2.8529  -0.0015  -1.231
Rainfall deviation I x HH pop squared  0.00001  1.9335  0.0001  2.503
Female headship I dummy  -0.0691  -0.703  -0.4231  -1.512
Distance to market  -0.003  -0.172  -0.0915  -1.725
District Extension %  0.0109  1.456  -0.0223  -1.392
Primary education  -0.0463  -0.099  -1.0837  -0.863
Secondary education  0.3193  0.668  0.5431  0.585Table 3: Demand for Fertilizer  / ha.
EXPLANATORY  VARIABLES  SML estimator  TLS estimator
ESTIMATES  STD. ERRORS  ESTIMA TES  STD. ERRORS
Intercept  -3.01**  0.22
Time Trend (T)  -0.41**  0.12  -0.59**  0.13
Log of HH adult population (POP)  1.01**  0.09  0.54-  0.18
Credit Received (1000 Ks)  0.48**  0.02  0.13*  0.07
Cattle Stock (1000 Ks)  0.05  0.07  0.11  0.10
Draught  Animals and Implements (1000 Ks)  1.21**  0.25  0.46  0.77
DM01  -0.01**  0.00  -0.04  0.04
Sex of HH's head (Women = 1)  -0.68**  0.13
Distance to Markets  -0.22**  0.02
Extension  -0.15  0.20
Primary education  -0.09**  0.12
Secondary Education  1.53  0.11
3.34**  0.01
Mean Log- Likelihood  -1.10792
Number of Observations  9706  9706
- Indicates  statistically  different  from  zero  at the 10%  significance  level.
Indicates  statistcally  different  from  zero  at  the 5%  significance  level.Table 4:  Credit Use Equation
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES  SML estimator  TLS estimator  Random effect probit
ESTIMATES  STD.  ESTIMATES  STD.  ESTIMATES  STD.
ERRORS  ERRORS  ERRORS
Intercept  -450.65**  36.94
Time Trend (T)  -161.94**  13.98  -170.48**  28.97
Log of HH adult population (POP)  113.35**  13.69  112.22**  56.31  0.335365**  0.042109
Cattle Stock (1000 Ks)  -37.44**  13.98  -56.11**  29.13  -0.00018**  0.000046
Draught Animals & implement (1000 K)  386.62**  56.84  333.18  236.07  0.000976**  0.00014
Sex of HH's head (Women  =  1)  94**-0.37624**  0.065369
Primary education  5.80**  1.54  -0.12828**  0.009673
Secondary Education  64.80**  15.93  0.005  0.057659
Distance to Markets  -34.98**  2.94  0.170135*  0.054838
s2  359.20**  19.83  0.6915  0.0485
Mean Log- Likelihood  -1.27
Number of Observations  9706  9706  9706
Indicates  statistically  different  from  zero  at the I0% significance  level.
Indicates  statistically  different  from  zero  at the  5%  significance  level.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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